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The legal status of American women has consistently been portrayed as a linear progression flowing from a
colonial jurisprudential repression and exclusion to a modern-day legal equity and a female influence within
every aspect of justice. In this narrative of sequentially gained status, seventeenth-century Puritan law has
stood as the exemplar of America’s most repressive jurisprudential treatment of women. However, when its
characteristics are triangulated and its subordination of women is juxtaposed with its inclusion of a female
voice, a new conception of America’s first legal system is seen. The notion of a linear progression is thus
replaced with an understanding that the modern day equity enjoyed by women is a product of extensive legal
fluctuation. Puritan women were clearly characterized as the subordinate gender and their secondary status
evidenced in the symbolic silencing of heretical females and in legal coverture. However, stemming from the
Puritan concept of a “Godly-society” attained through equitable legal status, New England women enjoyed
liberal divorce laws and a significant presence within the court room when compared with contemporary
England and the nineteenth century jurisprudence, which relegated women to the non-public sphere. Thus, as
Laurel Thatcher Ulrich emphasizes, we “need to move from static concepts like “patriarchal New England
society” to more intricate questions about the interplay of values and practice over time. Zion’s daughters have
for too long been hidden.”
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Revealing Zion’s Daughters: 
Women in Puritan Jurisprudence

Brett JackSon  
 The legal status of American women has consistently been portrayed as a linear 
progression flowing from a colonial jurisprudential repression and exclusion to a modern-day 
legal equity and a female influence within every aspect of justice.1  In this narrative of sequentially 
gained status, seventeenth-century Puritan law has stood as the exemplar of America’s most 
repressive jurisprudential treatment of women. However, when its characteristics are triangulated 
and its subordination of women is juxtaposed with its inclusion of a female voice, a new 
conception of America’s first legal system is seen. The notion of a linear progression is thus 
replaced with an understanding that the modern day equity enjoyed by women is a product of 
extensive legal fluctuation.  Puritan women were clearly characterized as the subordinate gender 
and their secondary status evidenced in the symbolic silencing of heretical females and in legal 
coverture. However, stemming from the Puritan concept of a “Godly-society” attained through 
equitable legal status, New England women enjoyed liberal divorce laws and a significant presence 
within the court room when compared with contemporary England and the nineteenth century 
jurisprudence, which relegated women to the non-public sphere. Thus, as Laurel Thatcher Ulrich 
emphasizes, we “need to move from static concepts like “patriarchal New England society” to 
more intricate questions about the interplay of values and practice over time. Zion’s daughters 
have for too long been hidden.”2 
  The Puritans explicitly believed in female inferiority. Even as Protestants “in revolt 
against the male Catholic hierarchy and convinced of the equality of souls before God, they 
nevertheless insisted on women’s proper subordination within the family.”3   John Calvin endorsed 
male-dominance in saying, “Let the woman be satisfied with her state of subjection, and not 
take it amiss that she is made inferior to the more distinguished sex.”4  Portrait renditions of 
the family reflected the polarization of gender before 1750, distinguishing a dominant group 
of men and breeched boys from the women and girls dressed in petticoats. Thus, as Mary Beth 
Norton wrote, “If a girl could be viewed as a miniature adult, the grown woman could be viewed 
1  Jill K. Conway, The Female Experience in Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century America: A Guide to the History of American Women, (New York:  
 Garland Publishing, Inc, 1982), 39.
2 Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, “Vertuous Women Found: New England Ministerial Literature, 1668-1735” in Nancy F. Cott and Elizabeth H. Pleck  
 eds., A Heritage of Her Own: Toward a New Social History of American Women (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 76.
3 Sara M. Evans, Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 22.
4 Ibid.
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as a more advanced child.”5  While there was much variation in the colonies, “the civil code of 
the New England colonies embodied a concept of marital unity striking in its expression of the 
patriarchal ideal that women’s private interests had to be subordinated to the greater familial 
whole.”6  The familial relationship most reflective of the patriarchy was a woman’s relationship 
to her husband. John Milton’s Paradise Lost defines this relation as “he for God only, she for 
God in him.”7  Thus, the subjection of a woman to a man parallels that of a man to God and 
is indicative of the female role within society as a whole.  Indeed, the church was essential in 
espousing the essentiality of women’s pious acquiescence to the will of the patriarchy.  
Women’s subordinate legal status was bolstered by church sermons like Cotton Mather’s 
Ornaments for the Daughters of Zion. In this 1692 oration, he said: 
As for her love to her husband, I may say, ‘Tis even strong as death, many waters cannot 
quench it; neither can the floods drown it. . . .When she reads that Prince Edward in his 
wars against the Turks, being stabbed with a poisoned knife, his princess did suck the 
poison out of his wonder with her own royal mouth; she finds in her own heart a principle 
disposing her to show her own husband as great a love. . . . But her love to her husband 
will also admit, yeah, and produce the fear of, a cautious diligence never to displease him. 
While she looks upon him as her guide, by the constitution of God . . . she does not fear 
his blows, yet she does fear his frowns, being loath in any way to grieve him, or cause a 
headache in the family by offending him. . . . In every lawful thing she submits her will 
and sense to his, where she cannot with calm reason convince him of inexpediences, and 
instead of grudging or captious contradiction, she acts as if there were but one mind in 
two bodies. . . . ‘tis by the kindness, the sweetness, the goodness of her expressions that 
she gives law unto him.8  
 Thus, Puritan women were directed by the church to honor their husbands and 
dutifully submit themselves to his will in order to ensure the health of the marriage and the 
efficiency of the household. As Thomas Gataker said in his 1620 Marriage Duties, “There can 
bee no ordinary intercourse and commerce or conversing between person and person, but 
there must be a precedencie on the one part, and a yielding of it on the other.”9  This familial 
hierarchy was analogized to the state writ small; the role of husband and wife represented a 
“little commonwealth.”10  Robert Cleaver spoke of this in his A Godlie Forme of Householde 
Government, published in 1598 saying, “The governours of families . . . upon whom the charges 
5 Mary Beth Norton, “The Evolution of White Women’s Experience in Early America,” The American Historical Review, 89 no. 3 (Jun., 1984): 604.
6 Ibid., 598.
7 Sara M. Evans, Born for Liberty, 22.
8 Sylvia R. Frey and  Marian J. Morton, New World, New Roles: A Documentary History of Women in Pre-Industrial America (New York: Greenwood
 Press, 1935), 17.
9 Thomas Gataker, Marriage Duties (London, 1620) in James T. Johnson, “The Covenant Idea and the Puritan View of Marriage,” Journal of the   
 History of Ideas 32, no. 1 (Jan-Mar. 1971): 111.
10 Mary Beth Norton, “The Evolution of White Women’s Experience in Early America,” 610.
15
of governmet lyeth, though unequally, are, first the Cheefe governour, which is the Husband, 
secondly a fellow helper, which is the Wife.”11  Thus the wife’s role within the home was “to guide 
the house and not guide the husband.”12  As a microcosm of the state-order, the relationship 
between married men and women modeled the social hierarchy.13  Male-governance from 
husbands and the colonial patriarchy was fundamental in the maintenance of social order. In 
accordance with the family-state analogy, women were to be equally deferential to both their 
husbands and the colonial church-state, while maintaining a “goodness” and “sweetness” toward 
the larger community. The prosecution of female dissidents and accusations of witchcraft leveled 
at women who failed to fulfill their proscribed role demonstrates the male dominance of Puritan 
culture and its value of female conformity. 
 The church-state of the 17th century effectively prosecuted religious non-conformists as 
well as transgressors of civil law. While criminals of both genders were put on trial to exemplify 
the social castigation resulting from immorality, the punishment of female dissidents worked 
on another level to reinforce women’s subjugation to the authority of the patriarchal governance 
and to men as a group. Anne Hutchinson was “the most famous heretic of Massachusetts Bay 
Colony” and was banished for holding home lectures which promoted antinomianism to 
guests of both genders.14  “Antinomianism stressed salvation through inner regeneration rather 
than through conformity to external rules imposed by church and state; this heresy threatened 
the stability of the Puritan community.”15  By preaching this ideal, Hutchinson promoted the 
questioning of religious dogma while also challenging the assumption that women should be 
non-participants in church affairs. While her prosecution was based on theological heresy, her 
high-profile banishment rested on “her unprecedented demand that she, a woman, be permitted 
to think for herself about God and provoke others, women included, into doing the same.”16 
John Winthrop, governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony labeled her “a woman of haughty 
and fierce carriage . . . of a nimble wit and active spirit, a very voluble tongue, more bold than a 
man, though in understanding and judgment inferior to many women.”17   According to Eleanor 
Fitzpatrick, by “maintaining that an individual could commune directly with God, Mistress 
Hutchinson was claiming equality for herself and everybody else with the men who ruled.”18 
Hugh Peter, an additional interrogator told Hutchinson, “you have stept out of your place, 
you have rather bine a Husband than a Wife, and a preacher than a Hearer; and a Magistrate 
than a Subject.”19  Her self-assertion had therefore threatened the male dominance in familial, 
11 Robert Cleaver, A Godlie Forme of Household Government (London, 1598) in James T. Johnson, “The Covenant Idea and the Puritan View of  
 Marriage,” 111.
12 Edmund S. Morgan, The Puritan Family: Religion and Domestic Relations in Seventeeth-Century New England (New York: Harper and Row,   
 1944), 43.
13 Mary Beth Norton, “The Evolution of White Women’s Experience in Early America,” 610.
14 Sylvia R. Frey and  Marian J. Morton, New World, New Roles, 73.
15 Ibid., 73.
16 Eleanor Flexner and Ellen Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman’s Rights Movement in the United States (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of   
 Harvard University Press, 1996), 9.
17 Ibid., 10. 
18 Ibid.,10.
19 Sara M. Evans, Born for Liberty, 32.
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religious and political spheres.20  While the Puritans appreciated the midwifery of Hutchinson, 
they cited the Apostle Paul and condemned women who gained followers by “speaking things 
which they ought not.”21   Frey and Morton conclude that “Hutchinson’s open questioning of 
the moral and intellectual qualifications of the political religious leadership threatened the male 
hegemony, especially since she herself had a wide and powerful following.”22  
 While trials like that of Anne Hutchinson worked to “silence women as political 
beings and religious leaders,” witchcraft allegations also surfaced in the 17th century to censure 
offensive or rebellious women and to purge the Puritan community of undesirables.23  According 
to Cornelia Hughes Dayton, the Puritan community “unquestioningly cast women as witches 
and condoned a prosecutorial double standard for accused men and women such that twenty-
eight women and only seven men were hanged for the crime of witchcraft.”24  With a limited 
intellect and a lower-social status, a woman was thought to be more vulnerable to the Devil’s 
influence.25   The trials in Salem, Massachusetts point to the conclusion that accused witches 
were overwhelmingly married or widowed women between the ages of forty-one and sixty, the 
age in which they were both at the height of their social power and on the verge of losing status 
with the onset of menopause.26  Cotton Mather’s recording of a specter sighting by an afflicted 
girl attests to the conception of witches as older women: “What a dreadful Sight are You! An Old 
Woman, an Old Servant of the Divel!”27  Many accused women had developed a reputation for 
petulant relations with neighbors and a poor rapport with the community as a whole. Mrs. Anne 
Hibbens who was known for her “unnatural crabbedness of…temper” was excommunicated 
following an argument with the town carpenters over their work on her home.28  In 1656 
after the death of her husband, who was a well-respected Bostonian, Hibbens was convicted 
and executed as a witch. It is thus evident that witchcraft allegations functioned within New 
England society as a mode of social control. The process operated in a straightforward manner 
on any individual who pondered action censured by the community. It was understood that 
if one carried out such a violation they would make themselves more vulnerable to the charge 
of witchcraft.29   The fact that this control mechanism primarily affected women is congruent 
with the patriarchal nature of Puritan society. 
20 Ibid.
21 Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, A Midwife’s Tale: The Life of Martha Ballard Based on Her Diary 1785-1812 (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 46.
22 Sylvia R. Frey and  Marian J. Morton, New World, New Roles, 7.
23 Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Women Before the Bar: Gender, Law, and Society in Connecticut, 1639-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
 Press, 1995), 9.
24 Ibid., 9.
25 Sara M. Evans, Born for Liberty, 23.
26 John Demos, “Underlying Themes in the Witchcraft of New England,” in Stanley Katz, ed., Essays in Politics and Social Development Colonial   
 America (Boston: Little Brown and Company,1971), 118; Mary Beth Norton, “The Evolution of White Women’s Experience in Early America,” 611. 
27 Ibid., 124.
28 John Demos, “Underlying Themes in the Witchcraft of New England,” 118; Nancy Cott, ed. “Church Trial of Mistress Anne Hibbens” in Root   
 of Bitterness: Documents of the Social History of American Women (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986), 47.
29 John Demos, “Underlying Themes in the Witchcraft of New England,” 124. 
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 The most pervasive and effectual legal restraint placed on women in accordance 
with a Puritan patriarchy was the policy of coverture. Within a section of Cotton Mather’s 
Ornaments for the Daughters of Zion, in which he defines the proper role for widows he bolds 
Isaiah 54.5:  THY MAKER IS THEY HUSBAND.30   It was through clerical bolstering such as 
this, that the common law practice of coverture retained such an extensive and enduring hold 
in America. Indeed, coverture for women remained fixed fifteen decades after the governor of 
Connecticut held the first pre-trial examinations for the New Haven court in 1639. As William 
Blackstone explained this legal status years later, “The very being or legal existence of the woman 
is suspended during the marriage, or at least is… consolidated into that of the husband: under 
whose wing, protection and cover, she performs every thing…in our law …her condition…is 
called coverture.”31  England described the policy in The Lawes Resolution for Women’s Rights 
of 1632: “A woman as soon as she is married, is a covert, in Latin, nupta, that is, veild, as it 
were, clouded and overshadowed, she hath lost her streame . . . To a married woman, her new 
self is her superior, her companion, her master.”32  Puritans adopted this foundational doctrine 
of English common law, also known as “civil death,” because they understood it as religiously 
significant. Civil death rested on Genesis 2:22-23: “And Adam said this is now bone of my 
bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of man. 
Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife and they 
shall be one flesh.”33  Thus, the relationship between a “feme covert” and her husband was 
accepted as mirroring that of a vassal to a lord.34  
 In accordance with the Puritan conception religious civil society, the legal diction 
in The Lawes Resolution of Women’s Rights describing coverture was flavored with a moral and 
religious tone. Women’s subordinate status was a punishment for Eve’s seduction of Adam:
exiled from the Garden of Eden, enjoined to labor, Eve because she had helped to seduce 
her husband has inflicted on her a especial bane. In sorrow shall thou bring fourth thy 
children, thy desires shall be subject to they husband, and he shall rule over thee . . . See 
here the reason . . . that women have no voice in Parliament, they make no laws, the consent 
to none, they abrogate none. All of them are understood either married or to be married 
and their desires are subject to their husband . . . 35 
 This explanation of coverture was adopted throughout New England and the policy 
ensured a husband’s dominion over wife as she was prohibited thereafter from “alienating 
property, entering into contracts, bringing lawsuits, or making a will without the consent and, 
30 Sylvia R. Frey and  Marian J. Morton, New World, New Roles, 31.
31 Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Women before the Bar, 20.
32 Eleanor Flexner and Ellen Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman’s Rights Movement in the United States, 7.




often, the joint action of her husband.”36  In contrast to married femes covert, single women 
and widows held the status of “femes sole,” legal persons free of male-control. Single women 
over eighteen and widowed women had status within the legal system as individuals. They 
could sue under their own name, write wills, and bequeath property. Coverture ensured that 
the funds and property belonging to a woman would be subsumed under the ownership of her 
husband. Henrietta East Caine, who had owned a profitable millinery shop located on Boston’s 
Marlborough Street lamented that “her Friends will not supply her with Goods to carry on her 
business as before,” because she was still under a marriage contract to her bigamist, deserter 
husband.37   A woman with a large savings was at risk of becoming destitute due to her husband’s 
fiscal mismanagement; Mary Hunt of Boston was impoverished when her husband spent her 
fortune of fifteen hundred pounds before deserting her and her small children.38  Thus, Henrietta 
and Mary were powerless to conduct business to their own economic benefit while still married. 
As Nancy Cott suggests, the wives’ “adherence to the norm of economic dependence resulted 
in their own economic powerlessness.”39  While a widow, a feme sole, was entitled to dower 
rights over one-third of her husband’s land, her claim over his larger estate upon her death was 
void and the land bequeathed to her husband’s male heirs. Thus, the patriarchy was sustained 
as “wealth, most frequently defined as land, was transmitted from one generation of men to 
another.”40   Indeed, a father’s will usually granted a daughter only one-half of the inheritance 
reserved for her brothers, and she usually gained personal property rather than real-estate.41 
 Coverture ensured women’s non-connection with property, since married women legally 
owned none. Contemporary wills attest to this fact. As a legal entity, women could only write 
wills with their husband’s consent. Widows or women who had gained permission to write a 
will could bequeath their own property, usually amounting to household goods and clothes, 
and possibly livestock. Anne Burt, a Massachusetts resident wrote a will in 1664 in which, after 
granting livestock to her children stipulated a beneficiary for each of her possessions, listing:
I give to Elizabeth basset a new feather bed A boulster and a pillow and a pillow beare A 
blankit and a Rouge and i give to Sarah bassit my ould feather bed a boulster and pillow
. . . A tapsterri Covering and i give to meriam bassit A Copper ketel, A table Cltoh and 
half A doson of napkins and a ew shep, han toweland I give to mary bassit my biggest 
eiorn pot.42
36 Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Women Before the Bar, 19.
37 Nancy Cott, “Eighteenth-Century Family and Social Life Revealed in Massachusetts Divorce Records,” in Nancy Cott and Elizabeth H. Pleck, 
eds., A Heritage of Her Own: Toward a New Social History of American Women (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 120.
38 Ibid., 121.
39 Ibid.
40 Paula A. Treckel, To Comfort the Heart: Women in Seventeenth Century America (New York: Twane Publishers, 1996), 24.
41 Mary Beth Norton, “The Evolution of White Women’s Experience in Early America,” 603.
42 Nancy Woloch, Early American Women: A Documentary History 1600-1900 (Boston:McGraw-Hill,2002), 87.
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 Women’s coverture had remarkable longevity, only in mid-nineteenth century as state 
legislatures began to enact married women’s property rights, did “the edifice of coverture start 
to crumble.”43  Its legacy was an effective suppression of female legal action long after symbolic 
silencing of maleficent women as witches became outmoded. The wholesale acceptance of 
coverture within Puritan society demonstrates that New England’s legal liberalities regarding 
women did not flow from an abandonment of British patriarchy. Indeed, the social ascendancy 
of the husband according to James Johnson was “but a bow to social condition in seventeenth 
century England.”44  
 The New England Puritans, while implementing the British common law as blueprint 
for their jurisprudence, exhibited a significant departure from English legal doctrine by 
sanctioning divorce within their colonies. As their contemporaries in England were “locked into 
marital vows for life,” women in New England were granted this considerable legal advantage.45 
The conception of law in the New World was heavily influenced by the Protestant Reformation 
which denied the sacramental identity of marriage. Within English common law, marriage as 
a sacrament was an indissoluble contract. Annulments through ecclesiastical courts or special 
acts of Parliament were reserved only for the wealthy.46  American colonies founded with an 
Anglican majority adhered to the sacramental concept of England, and within their jurisdiction a 
consummated marriage was not to be broken.47  More liberally, Puritan New England introduced 
marriage as a civil contract and divorces were an option in cases of desertion, prolonged absence, 
adultery, or bigamy, with the injured party retaining the right to remarry. Divorce proceedings 
were heard in secular courts, and the proceedings were based on Luther’s reasoning as explained 
by Dayton: “as with any other contract the gross misbehavior of one spouse in breaking the 
terms, notably through neglect or infidelity should abrogate the contract and free the aggrieved 
party to remarry.”48  New England provided for “absolute” divorce, or divorce a vinculo, in 
contrast to Anglican colonies which limited divorce to a legal separation with no right of 
either party to remarry.49  In addition to their doctrinal dissent regarding Anglican sacrament, 
New England lawmakers favored liberal divorce policies in order to curtail the widespread 
bigamy they saw in England and in colonies in which divorce was forbidden. Upon witnessing 
abandoned wives living in destitution because their coverture prevented them from engaging 
in commerce and lawsuits in pursuit of self-sufficiency, Puritan leaders saw a social benefit in 
freeing them from their precarious position. According to Nancy Woloch, “Such arrangements 
satisfied the Puritan desire to ensure family harmony, prevent destitution, and keep deserted 
wives and families off the public dole.”50  Thus, just as Puritan religious leaders had argued for 
43 Ibid., 70.
44 James T. Johnson, “The Covenant Idea and the Puritan View of Marriage,” 11.
45 K. Kelly Weisberg, “ Under Greet Temptations Heer” Women and Divorce in Puritan Massachusetts,” Feminist Studies 2 (1975): 190.
46 Ibid., 69.
47 Sylvia R. Frey and  Marian J. Morton, New World, New Roles, 94.
48 Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Women before the Bar, 109.
49 Nancy Woloch, Early American Women, 69.
50 Ibid. 
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a promotion of equal punishment for sexual transgression in 17th century England, they also 
espoused gender-equality in divorce petitioning. Divorce requests filed by women were heard 
in Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay as early as the 1630’s, but comparable hearings would 
not occur in England until 1857.51 
 Massachusetts and Connecticut as Puritan colonies both allowed for divorce a vinculo 
and Massachusetts courts between 1639 and 1692, granted some 27 divorces.52  It was not until 
1677, after divorces had been granted for over 22 years, that Connecticut finally quietly passed 
a statute listing justifiable reasons for suit: adultery, fraudulent contract, willful desertion, or 
seven years’ absence.53   The codification of this law translated into a greater freedom for colonial 
women, the gender most likely to file for divorce. Indeed, the most common recipient of a 
Connecticut divorce was the deserted wife. Men who wished to escape a spouse or children 
without legal grounds for divorce would often vanish and possibly remarry in a new community.54 
Even before the Connecticut Divorce Law was enacted in 1677, abandoned women brought 
suit in order to throw off their coverture and the memory of their husband. Examples from 
1660 and 1676 reveal much about the rulings of the Connecticut courts when deserted women 
stood before the bar:
This Court orders that in case Sarah north hear not of her husband by that seventh year be 
expired (he haveing bene absent six, already) that then she shal be free from her conjugal 
bonds. (1660) 
Upon the petition of Sarah Towle whoe hath been desrted by her husband above six years, 
without any care or provision made for supply of her or her child’s maintenance by her 
husband, this Court declares that in case the said Twole shall have opportunity to joyner 
herself in marriage with another man, she is left at liberty soe to doe without offence to 
the law or this Court. (1676)55
 Divorce petitions reflect the presence of women within colonial jurisprudence. In 
the inclusion of a female voice within New England courts and the promulgation of equitable, 
gender neutral morality law, Puritan law can be seen as more inclusive than that of England. 
The seventeenth century courtroom was community-focused and broad in its representation. 
Its activities centered on “maintaining harmonious neighborly relations, ensuring equitable 
local trading, and monitoring sexual and moral conduct,” all embraced the essentiality of the 
female perspective. The presence of women as witnesses, plaintiffs, and defendants reflects the 
informal role of women as “guardians of communal morality.”56  In opposition to the English 
51 K.Kelly Weisberg, “Under Greet Temptations Heer,” 184.
52 Ibid., 69.
53 Ibid., 69.
54 Carol Berkin and Leslie Horowitz, eds., Women’s Voices, Women’s Lives: Documents in Early American History (Boston: Northeastern University   
 Press, 1998), 60.
55 Nancy Woloch, Early American Women, 73.
56 Sara M. Evans, Born for Liberty, 31.
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jurisprudential tradition, women’s access to courts in Puritan New England was advanced by 
the colonies’ prohibition against lawyers, their simple procedural rules, and the magistrates’ 
idea that God would guide their decisions.57  The Puritans adopted the English practice of 
prosecuting moral lapses, yet they rejected ecclesiastical courts in favor of a layman judiciary over 
a professionalized bar. The early abandonment of more formalistic constructs of English common 
law thus allowed for a significant female presence in court. While women were not allowed to 
be lawyers or judges, they were granted considerable credibility both in bringing petitions and 
on the witness stand due to the Puritan ambition for achieving a “Godly-society.”
 The Puritan’s attempt at equity stemmed from their belief that a God-fearing and pious 
society required equal punishments for a comprehensive elimination of sin and vice. As Cornelia 
Hughes Dayton says, Puritan judges in New Haven strove to enact a single gender neutral 
standard for moral offenses due to their “strongly held belief that godly behavior should be the 
measure for all inhabitants.”58  “Hence sinners, whether women or men, servants or wealthy 
church members, could expect to be lectured from the bench to follow “the rule” of neighborly 
kindness, to refrain from “wicked” “uncleanness,” or to emulate such familiar biblical figures as 
“Micaell the Archangell.”59  Thus, as Dayton explains, women who brought charges of sexual 
assault “had good reason to believe that their voices would not be ignored and that the men 
elected to the bench would not reflexively use whatever skeptical views they harbored of women’s 
nature to shield accused men from exposure and penalty.”60  After Mercy Payne explained “a 
large relation” of her efforts to resist John Frost’s advances, the magistrates challenged Frost’s 
denials saying “What temptation should shee bee under to bring sucha thing out to her owne 
shame?”61  In cases such as this, and those concerning rape, domestic violence, and premarital 
sex, the court openly accepted female testimony and severely punished the accused men. The 
central Puritan dogma that the individual was to be obedient to God’s law ensured that men 
would be punished for sinful behavior. While a double standard of sexual morality did develop, 
de jure equality was a Puritan ambition and, as Dayton states, “policies that were intended to 
create the most God-fearing society possible operated to reduce the near-absolute power that 
English men by law wielded over their wives, to undercut men’s sense of sexual entitlement to 
women’s bodies, and to relieve women in some situations from their extreme dependency on 
men.”62  
 Thus the lay-judiciary, informal procedure, and the focus on morality prosecutions 
allowed for a significant female presence within the early New England courtroom. The exclusion 
of women from a fraternal-type jurisprudence was not a Puritan construct, but rather a product 
of the increasing secularization of New England starting in the 18th century. While secularization 
57 Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Women Before the Bar, 10.
58 Ibid., 31.
59 Ibid. 




has typically been thought of as a force for widening the legal status of women, it was this process 
which effectively shelved the doctrine of moral equity and suppressed the female voice within 
New England courts until women were relegated to a domestic sphere removed from easy access 
to the legal realm.63  Secularization was fueled by the increasing religious diversity stemming from 
an influx of Dutch, Scottish, German, and Quaker immigrants and the increasing dominance 
of American-born Puritan generations. However, increasing colonial commercialization was 
the central development leading toward secularization. New Englanders began to engage in 
maritime trade, “thus introducing alien commercial elements into the Bible commonwealths.”64 
As the 18th century dawned, colonial courts increasingly shifted in facilitation of the expanding 
economy and the court’s constituency became limited to propertied men active in this blossoming 
capitalism.65  While judges and lawmakers made no concerted effort to curtail the courtroom 
presence of women, the rise of the professional bar and the increased adherence to English 
common law and rules of evidence raised barriers which would prevent equal court access for 
women.
 As the court-room became increasingly defined as a male arena, the church began to 
see a rise in female influence. The late 17th century declension was defined by a decrease in male 
church membership due to a consuming focus on commercial opportunities.66   Contemporary 
men understood that “the goals of religion-to create a godly society-often conflicted with the 
goals of commerce,” and within this time period, “commerce usually won.”67  Fewer men in 
the church resulted in a loss of clerical power over the community. The church was pushed to 
the margins of political life just as women were beginning to wield increasing influence within 
its confines. Thus, while the colonial legal system increasingly shifted away from moralistic 
prosecutions in order to focus on commercial adjudication, the church began to make “the passive 
female a symbol of Christian virtues, and associate men and manliness with the materialistic 
and competitive world of trade.”68  Although passivity had always been a characteristic valued in 
females, as evidenced by the prosecution of vocal dissidents like Ann Hutchinson, the association 
of women with spirituality and men with secular concerns signaled a divergence from the Puritan 
ideal of spiritual equality. Thus, the church was defining women as the protectors of spirituality 
at the same time that the court was adopting common law principles facilitating the shift from 
court-enforced social morality towards commercial law. In this way the concept of women as 
moral arbiters hardened and worked in concert with the formalization of courtroom procedure 
to virtually eliminate the female familiarity with colonial courts. As Laurel Thatcher Ulrich 
explains in A Midwife’s Tale, “for most women, attending court was more than “inconvenient, 
It was venture into an alien world.”69  
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 As men and women became encapsulated in narrowing and polarizing social roles, the 
Puritan commitment to moral equity began to fade. Economics, trade, and an emerging sense 
of privacy led to a decreased focus on the moral health of the community. The patriarchal legal 
culture began to abandon the Puritan-style court confessions of moral crimes such as slander, 
pre-marital sex, and drunkenness. The moral upkeep of the town elites, as was an early Puritan 
ambition, was abandoned as American law came to mirror the common law. The middle class 
was increasingly sheltered from public ignominy and punishment as the court began to target 
impoverished and marginal women when prosecuting sexual deviancy. The legal shift away from 
prosecutions of moral lapses in an increasingly male-dominated system “introduced skeptical 
attitudes toward the reliability of women’s charges of male abuse.”70  This suspicion is evidenced 
through contemporary newspapers and almanacs which demonstrated an increasing “toleration 
of misogynist, anti-matrimonial, and bawdy themes,” previously censored by Puritan purists. 
This environment not only prevented many women from participating in the legal culture, 
but it also raised the burden of proof placed upon any woman to secure recompense for an 
accusation she ventured to bring before the bar. Consequently, not only did divorces become 
more difficult to obtain, but “the stricter the rules of evidence, the more difficult it was to win 
a case that required juries to accept the word of a woman against the word of a man, unless he 
happened to belong to a stigmatized group.”71   As Ulrich explores a rape case in A Midwife’s Tale 
she discovers that they frequently became “a contest between the men involved, the husband or 
father, the accused, the judges and jury rather a judgment of the events themselves.”72  Therefore, 
in response to a rapidly commercializing society and an increasing secularism, within the 18th 
century the “collective commitment to upholding a God-fearing society through the courts had 
been abandoned and Puritan resistance to the technicalities of English common law practice 
had faded,” and gender-specific spheres had hardened when “a new public life emerged from 
which women were excluded.”73   
 The 18th century legal formalization and mirroring of common-law procedure within 
New England not only increasingly isolated women from court, but it also “foreshadowed the 
more explicit nineteenth-century ideology that reserved the public realms of commerce, law 
and politics to men and gave white women moral dominion over privatized families.”74  Thus, 
women’s legal subordination was augmented as Puritan jurisprudence was replaced in America. 
While the Puritan prosecuted heretical females and retained a coverture policy in order to clearly 
define women as the subordinate sex, their focus on Godly equality and maintaining moral 
order translated into liberal divorce laws and a significant female presence within the colonial 
courtroom. When Puritan law is viewed in this multidimensional manner, it can no longer be 
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simplified in accordance with its traditional classification as America’s ultimate jurisprudential 
repression of women. Indeed, as Cornelia Hughes Dayton concludes, “if  Puritan approaches 
to the law, such as simplifying civil procedure, punishing men and women equally, and 
receiving women’s stories of abuse supportively had been retained as permanent fixtures of the 
evolving American legal system, the result would have been a less patriarchal society in the long 
run.”75  
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